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Abstract. The purpose of this study is to analyse the effectiveness of the performance-
based funding scheme of the Finnish universities that was adopted at the beginning of 
2013. The political decision-makers expect that the funding scheme will create 
incentives for the universities to improve performance, but these funding schemes have 
largely failed in many other countries, primarily because public funding is only a small 
share of the total funding of universities. This study is interesting because Finnish 
universities have no tuition fees, unlike in many other countries, and the state allocates 
funding based on the objectives achieved. The empirical evidence of the graduation 
rates indicates that graduation rates increased when a new scheme was adopted, 
especially among male students, who have more room for improvement than female 
students. The new performance-based funding scheme allocates the funding according 
to the output-based indicators and limits the scope of strategic planning and the 
autonomy of the university. The performance-based funding scheme is transformed to 
the strategy map of the balanced scorecard. The new funding scheme steers universities 
in many respects but leaves the research and teaching skills to the discretion of the 
universities. The new scheme has also diminished the importance of the performance 
agreements between the university and the Ministry. The scheme increases the 
incentives for universities to improve the processes and structures in order to attain as 
much public funding as possible. It is optimal for the central administration of the 
university to allocate resources to faculties and other organisational units following 
the criteria of the performance-based funding scheme. The new funding scheme has 
made the universities compete with each other, because the total funding to the 
universities is allocated to each university according to the funding scheme. There is a 
tendency that the funding schemes are occasionally improved. The findings of this study 
are useful for those who wish to modify the funding scheme in the future.  
   
Keywords: financing, funding scheme, incentives, performance, university, higher 
education. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The long duration of studies and low graduation rates in higher education 
have attracted attention from Finnish decision-makers who are trying to find 
solutions to the weak performance of universities. Performance-based 
funding represents an attempt to encourage universities to improve quality 
and performance while helping the nation to improve economic growth and 
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employment. The aim of performance-based funding is to motivate 
institutions to improve their processes of research and education. Previous 
studies indicate that the effectiveness of performance-based funding is 
limited (Volkwein & Tanberg, 2008). Public funding represents only a small 
proportion of the total funding of higher education in many countries, 
diminishing the steering effect. Finland is an exception, because Finnish 
universities require no tuition fees in degree education. 
 
The funding scheme of Finnish universities was changed at the beginning of 
the 1990s and introduced some performance-based elements. The university 
reform separated universities from the state, made universities legal entities 
and increased the importance of output measures in 2010. Each Finnish 
university and the Ministry of Education and Culture conduct performance 
negotiations at the beginning of the agreement term. The Ministry sets 
operational and qualitative targets for the university and determines the 
resources required. The performance agreement provided the funding for 
universities based on the number of students and the expected and actual 
number of degrees until 2012. Funding was also allocated to the quality and 
internationalization of education and research and the activities of the 
education and science policy. The reform in 2013 increased the importance 
of output measures. 
 
The new performance-based funding scheme has been used to allocate the 
state funding to Finnish universities since the beginning of 2013. While 
efforts have been made to develop a more transparent and clearer funding 
scheme in order to increase its steering effect, the elaborate indicator-based 
system, particularly in the case of Finnish universities, has over the years 
become increasingly complex because there has been a tendency to 
introduce new elements to the unsatisfactory scheme (Melin et al., 2015). 
 
The purpose of this study is to describe and analyse the performance-based 
funding scheme of Finnish universities based on many output-based 
indicators. The funding scheme is translated to the strategy map of the 
balanced scorecard approach developed by Kaplan and Norton (2001, 2004). 
The strategy map reveals that the funding scheme does not pay attention to 
the research and teaching skills of universities. Neither does it encourage 
universities to increase the funding of education by means other than state 
funding. The missing indicators of the funding scheme are left to the 
autonomy of the universities.  
 
Results from the United States show that performance-based funding 
schemes have been unstable and uneven. The study by McLendon, Hearn and 
Deaton (2006) shows that only half of the states have adopted performance-
based funding for higher education, and half of those that adopted 
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performance funding later eliminated it. These poor results have led to the 
many changes in the amount and criteria of public funding (Dougherty, 
Natow & Vega, 2012). The balanced scorecard approach is useful, because it 
aims to balance the perspectives of the customer, financing, processes and 
structures, and learning and growth. It also makes sure that all the necessary 
elements are included in the implementation of the funding scheme. 
 
Empirical evidence is presented using the data of Education Statistics 
compiled by the Statistics Finland. The results indicate that unlike in many 
other countries, the graduation rates in Finland improved when the new 
funding scheme was adopted. In particular the graduation rates improved 
among male students, who on average have lower graduation rates than 
female students. This notable steering effect can be explained by the fact that 
there are no tuition fees, and state funding has a notable role in the total 
overall funding of Finnish universities. In such a situation, universities 
attempt to improve their processes and structures in order to obtain as much 
state funding as possible.  
 
The remainder of this paper is set up as follows. The next section includes the 
literature review, which argues that funding schemes in higher education 
should create incentives for universities, teachers, and students to improve 
performance. The third section includes data and methodology. It presents 
the performance-based funding scheme of the Finnish universities and 
transfers it to the strategy map, which can be used to reveal the unbalanced 
indicators of the funding scheme. The results and discussion in the fourth 
section present the empirical evidence about the graduation rates for Finnish 
universities at the time when the new funding scheme was adopted. The 
concluding comments are presented in the final section. 
 
 
Literature review 
 
The shift of the cost burden from governments to students is a worldwide 
trend manifested in the introduction or increasing of tuition fees and user 
charges for food and lodging, along with the diminution of student grants. 
The phenomenon is seen globally and recently also in Europe, which had for 
a long time remained a continent where higher education did not commonly 
require tuition fees. Finland is one of the last bastions where education 
toward degrees is free from tuition fees. This provides an interesting 
environment in which to study the performance-based funding scheme, 
which was adopted in Finnish universities from the beginning of 2013. 
 
Most developed countries have subsidized the provision of higher education 
and applied funding schemes which rely on contributions from students. The 
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problem with tuition fees is that some of the students may be unable to pay 
them, and even if loans are available, education is often viewed as a risky 
investment, which can hinder participation. Funding schemes that rely on 
income-contingent loans provide insurance against uncertain educational 
outcomes (Del Rey & Racionero, 2010). Loans, when offered, should be large 
enough to cover tuition fees and living costs. 
 
Chapman (2006) considered the following funding schemes: 1) the 
traditional tax-subsidy system where the cost of education is financed by 
general taxes, 2) pure loans, where each student pays for her or his own 
education, 3) income-contingent loans with risk-sharing, where successful 
graduates pay the full cost of their education but the cost to educate 
unsuccessful students is financed by general taxes and is, hence, shared by 
the whole population, and 4) income-contingent loans with risk-pooling, 
where successful students pay the full cost of the education of their cohort. 
Repayment can be income contingent or limited to a certain percentage of 
earnings, income surtax, or additional tax on income until the loan has been 
repaid (Johnstone, 2004).  
 
Finland offers income-contingent loans for living costs financed by general 
taxes. García-Peñalosa and Wälde (2000) show that, when education 
outcomes are uncertain and the degree of risk aversion is large enough, 
income-contingent loans with risk-pooling are better than either pure loans, 
because they provide greater insurance, or income-contingent loans with 
risk-sharing, because they do not involve any redistribution from non-
students to students. Del Rey and Racionero (2010) also agreed with these 
results and found that the income-contingent loans provide a system with the 
largest insurance.  
 
The arguments for funding higher education via lower state funding and 
higher tuition fees largely rest on the slow economic growth, which forces 
central governments to cut expenditures on higher education. Vandenberghe 
and Debande (2008) estimated how higher tuition fees influence graduates’ 
private return on educational investment using data from Belgium, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom. They found that increasing tuition fees and costs of 
higher education does not significantly affect the private rate of return. The 
introduction and increase of tuition fees shifts the cost burden from the 
public sector to students. 
 
The educational ambitions of students depend on their social background 
(Holm & Jaeger, 2008). The proportion of students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds is lamentably small and the public funding comes from general 
taxation while the major beneficiaries come from better-off backgrounds 
(Barr, 2005). When students and their families pay little or nothing, either in 
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tuition or for food or lodging, the students may be too tempted to remain in 
that status for a very long time, denying society and the economy the 
advantages of their potential productivity and presumed enhanced 
usefulness, whether to themselves or to the state. However, with a little cost 
sharing in the form of tuition fees and other costs, a much greater incentive 
is at least presumed to be on the part of the student to study hard and 
graduate on time (Johnstone, 2004). 
 
Tuition fees and income-contingent loans with risk-pooling is one option 
which can be considered in Finland in the future. The duration of studies is a 
great challenge to Finnish education policy, because the duration of higher 
education studies in Finland is among the longest in the countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In 2013, 
the median time to master’s degree completion at universities was 6.5 years 
(Melin et al., 2015).  
 
The Finnish funding scheme relies on the myth that all universities are 
identical, should act identically, and should therefore be funded equally, and 
therefore can be questioned, but differential central funding is too complex 
to be the only mechanism. Barr (2005) argues that universities could 
institute a funding system by which institutions can charge to reflect their 
different costs and missions. Universities could collect the fees, which are 
covered by a loan entitlement. Students receive substantial benefits without 
tuition fees. It is therefore efficient and fair that they bear some of the costs 
(Barr, 2009). Tuition fees give universities more resources to improve 
quality and help improve efficiency, but an obvious argument is that fees 
deter students from poor backgrounds to be saddled with income-contingent 
loans. 
 
Political objectives are implemented by public funding and, in many cases, by 
performance-based funding schemes. The political decision-making tries to 
implement incentives to improve performance and establish sanctions for 
poor outcomes (Alexander, 2000; Burke, 2002; Herbst, 2007; Layzell, 1999; 
McLendon et al., 2006). Performance funding emphasises the importance of 
public accountability and dilutes the scope of institutional autonomy 
(Alexander, 2000; Dunn, 2003; Huisman & Currie, 2004; Lane, 2007). 
Strategic thinking and strategic management have been noted important in 
higher education institutions (Nicolae & Vițelar, 2013; Brătianu, 2015). The 
weakening of institutional autonomy subsequently reduces the importance 
of strategic management at the institutions. 
 
Public accountability and performance-based funding schemes have largely 
failed to achieve any real improvements in student outcomes. Volkwein and 
Tandberg (2008) present empirical evidence about failed accountability 
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policies and government reforms in the United States using the dataset from 
2000 to 2006. In addition, the study by Nisar (2015) found that paying for 
performance in most impact assessment studies have shown that such 
accountability policies have had a limited effect on the performance of higher 
education institutions in the United States. Moreover, the study by Dougherty 
and Reddy (2013) indicates that the underlying theory of performance-based 
funding is not well understood or articulated and it has done little to improve 
educational outcomes. One of the reasons is that performance-based funding 
represents only a small share of the total funding with tuition fees and other 
income. In addition, the role of teachers and other staff has not been fully 
analysed. 
 
The performance-based funding scheme may not be efficient to increase 
incentives, because the autonomous teachers may not be interested in the 
general objectives of education policy and the university if they do not 
receive any personal benefits from the increased funding. The performance-
based funding scheme is also unable to create incentives for students to be 
efficient and graduate by the scheduled time. Students’ incentives cannot be 
improved solely by the performance-based funding scheme, but the 
literature suggests income-contingent loans for the relevant funding 
mechanism.  
 
 
Data and methodology  
 
The challenges of Finnish education and science policy include 
internationalisation, doctoral education, late starting time in higher 
education, the long duration of studies, and the quality of research 
infrastructure. Small organisational units, the innovative working 
environments of institutions, and lack in risk taking have been seen as 
elements affecting the low quality of activities. The incoherence, low focus, 
and differentiation of higher education institutions have been seen as 
obstacles to high quality. 
 
The Government Programme states that the funding scheme should be 
renewed to better support the objectives of education policy such as 
completion of studies, faster transition to working life, the intensification of 
administration, the improvement of quality in education and research, 
internationalisation, and the stronger profiling of institutions to their focal 
areas. The funding scheme of universities aims to improve the achievement 
of the political objectives at the universities. 
The performance-based funding scheme creates prerequisites for the main 
tasks of universities, which include education towards degrees and research 
affecting the societal relationship and external impact of the university. It is 
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natural that the funding scheme should include funding criteria that describe 
the main tasks of institutions. Additional funding is available for research, but 
less so for education, because Finland has no tuition fees in degree education. 
 
The purpose of the funding scheme is to create stability for the universities 
so that the funding is based on the average performance of the previous three 
years. Each university knows the next year’s funding in its budget because 
funding is based on the calculation of the criteria of three previous years. 
Another purpose is the efficiency and effectiveness, which are implemented 
by output indicators. Most of the funding criteria are based on the results 
achieved by universities. The funding of the education and science policy is 
agreed for the period of performance agreement, which is four years. 
 
The funding of education is based on the number of master’s degrees agreed 
upon for the period of the performance agreement. The agreed-on numbers 
of degrees are upper limits for the performance funding and make sure to 
achieve the needs of society. With 55 European Credit Transfer System 
(ECTS) credits annually, the funding scheme also spurs the efficiency of the 
education process to shorten the duration of studies and increase the number 
of degrees awarded. The employment of graduates is also taken into account. 
The student exchange encourages incoming and outgoing students to have at 
least three months’ mobility.  
 
The funding of publications is based on the quality criteria. The Publication 
Forum of the Federation of Finnish Learned Societies maintains and develops 
the classification of scientific publication channels. It has a rating system of 
one (basic), two (leading) and three (top) to classify the quality of articles. 
Monographs also have a category, which has a weight of four. The number of 
doctoral degrees is classified in research with a notable weight in the funding 
scheme and is agreed upon as an upper limit in the performance agreements. 
The funding scheme encourages an institution to increase the competition 
for external funding for research, because state funding is not sufficient for 
all the necessary research. The scheme also encourages institutions to 
increase the number of foreign teaching and research staff and doctoral 
degrees to foreign students.  
 
The funding of education and science policy aims to create a high 
international profile, the implementation of institutional strategic plans, and 
the national tasks of institutions such as appliance intensiveness and 
education in small groups.  This funding aims to encourage institutions to 
make structural changes to bigger units and other aims of the education and 
science policy. The funding also includes funding specific requirements in the 
more expensive fields of education such as appliance intensiveness in natural 
sciences, technology, and medicine, and expensive education in arts 
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education. It also supports the National Library of Finland and Teacher 
Training Schools. 
 
The performance-based funding scheme means that universities are 
competing with each other. This is based on the fact that the annual state 
budget allocates a certain amount of funding for the university sector, and 
the funding is allocated for universities based on their performance. If a 
university improves its performance of the indicator more than others, the 
university is able to increase its funding on the basis on that criteria. The 
other indicators allocate funding in a similar way. The development of all the 
indicators and their weights determines the total funding. It is ideal for any 
university to keep its business secret about how to improve their efficiency 
when competing with other universities. 
 
Figure 1 describes the performance-based funding scheme of Finnish 
universities from the beginning of 2013. The funding scheme is a matrix 
where education, research, and education and science policy are described 
by the horizontal shapes while the external impact, quality, and 
internationalisation are described by the vertical columns. The crossroads of 
horizontal and vertical shapes include 15 criteria of the funding scheme. The 
weight of education is 41%, research 34%, and education and science policy 
25%.  
 
Education policy is a political plan for a better future. The strategic plan is an 
institutional blueprint which takes into account education policy and designs 
a better future. The strategic plans are commonly implemented and 
communicated using balanced scorecards developed by Kaplan and Norton 
(2001, 2004). The balanced scorecard approach has been widely 
implemented in higher education (Kettunen, 2008, 2011, 2015).  Hence the 
balanced scorecard can be applied in education policy and the performance-
based funding scheme. 
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Figure 1. The performance-based funding scheme of Finnish universities from 
the beginning of 2013 
 
Figure 2 depicts the strategy map of the performance-based funding scheme 
of Finnish universities. The strategy map developed in this study includes the 
perspectives of customers, financial, processes and structures, and learning 
and growth, along with causal linkages between them. The strategy map is a 
useful tool for making sure that all the necessary and relevant elements are 
included in the future planning. Hence it can reveal elements that can be 
included in the scheme in the future, when it is better, developed to meet the 
needs of education policy and the reality of universities. 
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Figure 2. The performance-based funding scheme of Finnish universities placed 
in the strategy map 
 
The customer perspective includes only the number of employed gradates 
with a small weight of 1%. When the funding scheme described in this study 
was initially planned, there were plans to also include feedback from 
students in the funding scheme, but there were statistical difficulties 
including the feedback indicator in the scheme and therefore that was left for 
future development. 
 
The financial perspective includes the objectives “funding for research” and 
“funding for education”. The funding for research is obtained from the frame 
programme Horizon 2020 of the European Union, international foundations 
and funds, the Academy of Finland, the Finnish Funding Agency for 
Innovation (Tekes) and various companies. Funding for degree education 
comes entirely from the state. The funding for continuing education and 
service to society is not included in the funding scheme, but it only includes 
the field-based funding of expensive education with a weight of 8%. 
 
The processes and structures perspective depicts the innovation chain from 
research to support services and structures (education and science policy) 
and finally teaching. The research process includes the research indicators 
with a total weight of 24%, support services and structures with a weight of 
Financial
Processes 
and
structues
Learning 
and growth
Customer
Teaching skills
Research 
Doctoral 
degrees 9%
Publications 13% 
Foreign teaching
and research 
staff 2% 
Teaching          
Master’s degrees 15%
Bachelor’s degrees 9%
Credits from the Open University 2%
Students achieved 55 credits 11%
Master’s degrees to foreign students 1%
Doctoral degrees to foreign students 1%
Student exchange 2%
Student and employer satisfaction
Employed graduates 1%

 Funding for research
 Competed research funding 9%

Research skills
 Funding for education
 Field-based funding 8%
Education
and science
policy
Strategy  
 funding 10%
National
 activities 7%    
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17%, and teaching, which has the highest weight of 41%. Criticism can be 
presented on the placement of the number of doctoral degrees and on the 
number of doctoral degrees of foreign students. They are not only doing 
research but also receiving education at the same time. Another criticism can 
be presented on the foreign teaching and research staff, which partly belongs 
to teaching. 
 
The learning and growth perspective is non-existent in the funding scheme. 
The perspective does not have any indicators included in the funding scheme. 
One of the key issues of the balanced scorecard approach is that it is an 
extension of accounting and action plan to also include learning and growth, 
which is important in the knowledge economy, especially in knowledge-
intensive organisations. The funding scheme also does not pay any attention 
to the knowledge and skills of teachers and research staff, even though they 
are important drivers of the external impact, quality, and 
internationalisation. The knowledge and skills are left to the autonomy of 
universities. There is no obligatory teacher training at Finnish universities. 
 
The overall methodological approach of this study is to connect the research 
questions and theoretical concepts as empirical data and select relevant tools 
and procedures as the coherent whole following the outlines presented by 
Bryman and Bell (2011) and Punch (2005). Qualitative research is used in 
this study to interpret the behaviour of universities. A case study described 
by Yin (2003) involves an interpretative approach, which is used here to 
capture the performance-based funding scheme, the balanced scorecard 
approach and empirical evidence. An interpretative study seeks enlightened 
details and a subjective understanding about the institutional management 
that is commonly omitted in quantitative studies (Mason, 2002). 
 
 
Results and discussion 
The central statistical office of Finland, Statistics Finland, published 
Education Statistics concerning the years 2012-2013, when the new 
performance-based funding scheme was introduced. The reform of the new 
system was well known at the universities beforehand, because the rectors 
of the universities and many other people were involved in the planning of 
the funding scheme. Hence the universities had time to adapt to the new 
system even though the teachers and other staff of the universities value 
autonomy and inevitably have some degree of resistance to change. 
 
Table 1 depicts the graduation rates of students at bachelor’s or master’s 
degree level at Finnish universities in 2012 and 2013 by gender and 
measured at 4.5 and 5.5 years of study. The results indicate that graduation 
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rates have increased at the 4.5 years of study mark. The most notable effect 
was seen among male students. The graduation rates did not, however, 
change notably at 5.5 years of study. It is also noteworthy that female 
students clearly achieve higher graduation rates than male students. Later 
years will provide more evidence about the graduation rates, but at this stage 
we can conclude that these preliminary results support the argument that 
the performance-based funding scheme promotes more rapid graduation. 
  
Table 1. The graduation rates at bachelor’s and master’s degree levels at 
Finnish universities in 2012 and 2013 
Length of 
study 
Gender Graduation rate 
2012, % 
Graduation rate 
2013, % 
4.5 years Male 36.9 40.2 
Female 58.6 59.3 
5.5 years Male 49.6 49.4 
Female 68.8 69.0 
 
The balance between public and private funding of education is an important 
policy issue. Higher education institutions receive a large share of their 
funding from public sources. The share of the performance-based funding in 
different countries is difficult to determine in an exact way, but de Boer et al. 
(2015) gave estimates for countries in the university sector: Netherlands 27-
32%, Austria almost 100%, Australia 20%, Denmark 60%, England 50%, 
Finland 75-100%, Hong Kong 23%, Ireland 0.8% in 2015 and 10% in the 
future, North-Rhine Westphalia 23%, Louisiana (USA) 25%, Scotland 85%, 
Tennessee 100%, Thuringia (Germany) 55%. 
 
The steering effect and clarity of the funding scheme depend on the potential 
of universities to influence the funding criteria. The national funding scheme 
has a stronger effect in Finland than in many other counties, because higher 
education in Finland has no tuition fees. Hence the funding scheme limits the 
scope of the universities’ autonomy. It also limits the scope of strategic 
decision-making for the university, which must carefully follow the funding 
scheme if it wants to secure as much state funding as possible. Performance-
based funding has also diminished the importance of performance 
agreements between the university and the Ministry of Education and 
Culture. 
 
Funding is targeted to universities according to the performance-based 
funding scheme. The university is able to allocate the funding to faculties and 
support services as they choose. If the central administration of the 
university uses its own funding scheme that is entirely different from the 
national funding scheme, that does not create incentives to behave according 
to the national funding scheme. Therefore it is optimal for the central 
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administration to use the national funding scheme when it allocates 
resources to the various organisational units of the university. 
 
Quality is a notable element in the funding scheme. It is meaningful, however, 
to note that the funding scheme does not pay attention to the quality audit of 
the national quality assurance agency. The quality assurance systems of the 
Finnish universities are audited every sixth year by the Finnish Education 
Evaluation Centre, which is the national quality assurance agency. If the 
university does not pass the quality audit, it will be re-audited after two or 
three years, but this does not affect the funding of the university. 
 
 
Conclusions and implications 
 
This study analysed the performance-based funding scheme of Finnish 
universities adopted from the beginning of 2013. The new funding system 
brought a notable amount of output measures to the funding scheme, which 
aims to improve performance and quality in higher education. The study is 
interesting because Finland is one of the few remaining countries that have 
no tuition fees for higher education. Compared with other countries where 
public funding has only a minor share of the total funding, the Finnish system 
has larger incentive effects on efficiency and effectiveness.  
 
The importance of strategic planning and performance agreements between 
the university and the Ministry has diminished due to the indicator-driven 
performance-based funding system of the universities. It is optimal for 
universities to improve processes and structures to achieve as much public 
funding as possible. It is also best for the university to allocate resources to 
the faculties and other organisational units following the criteria of the state 
funding. The funding scheme forces universities to compete with one other.  
 
The performance-based funding scheme was translated to the strategy map 
of the balanced scorecard approach, which is able to make certain that all the 
necessary elements are included in the scheme. The strategy map revealed 
that the Finnish funding scheme does not cover research and teaching skills 
but leaves them to the autonomy of the universities. The funding scheme 
does not include any output measures in the funding of education even 
though continuing education and service to society are potential activities to 
collect external funding. 
The empirical investigation demonstrates that graduation rates have 
increased at the bachelor’s and master’s levels since the new funding scheme 
was adopted. The Education Statistics of the central statistical office show 
that the increase was found at 4.5 years of study. Graduation rates overall are 
higher among female students, but the increase in graduation rate was 
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notable among male students, who have more room for improvement. At 5.5 
years of study, there were no notable changes in the graduation rates. These 
results support the argument that the performance-based funding scheme is 
able to affect the graduation rate. 
 
The performance-based funding scheme and the balanced scorecard 
approach presented in this study are limited to Finnish universities, but they 
can be modified for various countries to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of higher education institutions. A challenge and indeed a 
fruitful topic for further study is to analyse the sector of the Finnish 
universities of applied sciences, which adopted a new performance-based 
funding scheme at the beginning of 2014. Another important challenge is to 
study the motivation of students and personnel to stimulate improvements 
in the quality and efficiency of the teaching process. 
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